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We show that consumers high in dialecticism—the tolerance of contradictions and the expectations of change (Peng & Nisbett,
1999)—respond differently than low-dialecticism consumers to messages that have purely positive, mixed, or purely negative information. We
find first that for low dialectics, felt ambivalence—and discomfort—is greater for mixed information messages than for negative or positive
information. For high dialectics, however, mixed information leads to high felt ambivalence, but not to high discomfort. When given univalent
positive or negative information messages, high dialectics have more thoughts about information opposite in valence to that presented, when
presented with negative information messages. As a result, for high dialectics, univalent negative information produces the same high felt
ambivalence, and even greater discomfort, than do mixed information messages. Through these non-parallel effects, we show that the relationship
between felt ambivalence and discomfort is itself moderated by dialecticism. Through three experiments and using a novel manipulation of
dialecticism, we replicate and generalize these effects and provide process evidence.
© 2015 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Dialecticism; Information processing; Attitude ambivalence; Discomfort; Cross-cultural psychology; PersuasionIntroduction
While many research studies have examined the impact
on consumer information processing of regulatory focus and
self-construal (e.g., Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000), few have
investigated the effects of a more “dialectical” processing style.
As Wyer and Hong (2010, p.631) point out, although dialectical
processing style is well researched in the cross-cultural literature☆ The authors acknowledge the research grants awarded by the National
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Americans: Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng &
Nisbett, 1999), its role in consumer information processing has
not been examined in depth. Dialecticism is a style of information
processing that focuses on tolerance of contradictory information,
as well as expectations that the environment will continually
change (Nisbett et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Since
dialecticism concerns the expectations of contradictions in
everyday life, it ought to be especially useful in understanding
how consumers react to product messages that contain mixed-
valence information, such as that becoming more influential
today through social media and online reviews (e.g., Amazon.
com).
Since our focus here is on responses to product-related
messages that contain both, or only, negative and positive
information, it is natural that we examine the effect of thesell rights reserved.
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extensive prior literature.2 Ambivalent attitudes are attitudes
that contain independent elements of both positivity and
negativity, rather than overall unidimensional evaluations
(Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996, 2001). We also study
the effects on downstream discomfort. We contribute to the
literature by showing for the first time that while higher
dialecticism consumers (“high dialectics”) have the same strong
degree of attitudinal ambivalence to mixed and univalent
negative, but not positive, product information, low dialectics
feel more ambivalence to mixed information than to either
univalent (positive or negative) messages. Second, we show
a very important asymmetry in the effects of univalent
positive-only versus negative-only messages. For high dialec-
tics, but not low, negative messages evoke more ambivalence
than positive ones. This finding is new, and our theoretical
development provides a rationale for why this asymmetry
should arise. We make a third contribution by showing that the
number of self-generated cognitive “anticipated conflicting
responses” (Priester, Petty, & Park, 2007) underlies these
differences in ambivalence.
If consumers feel ambivalent about an attitude object, it seems
logical that they might also feel a sense of discomfort, and some
prior research has shown this effect (e.g., van Harreveld, van
der Pligt, & Yael, 2009), even equating felt ambivalence with
consequent tension and discomfort (e.g., Harmon-Jones, 2000;
Priester et al., 2007). We make a fourth contribution by showing
that the relationship between attitude ambivalence and discomfort
is itself moderated by dialecticism. Though low dialectics show
parallel effects across felt ambivalence and discomfort, high
dialectics do not. Thus, felt ambivalence and discomfort are
two distinct outcomes. We show these effects in a series of
experiments that use multiple complementary operationalizations.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Dialecticism
As a universal philosophy focusing on how to deal with
contradictions in life (Nisbett et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett,
1999), dialecticism is characterized by two elements. The first
is the belief that the world (reality) is constantly changing, so
that oppositions and paradoxes are continuously being created.
Thus the two sides of an apparent contradiction exist in active
harmony: bad becomes good, hate becomes love, and virtue
becomes evil. Therefore—the second key element—in this
changing world, those high in dialecticism believe that
contradictions can be regarded as natural, to be accepted
and tolerated (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng,
& Wang, 2010). By accepting contradictions, more-dialectical
people seek the middle “way” between extreme propositions.2 Note that we do not study effects on attitude valence, because messages
containing positive vs. mixed vs. negative information about a product will lead
to obvious and uninteresting effects on attitudes toward the product: positive
information should naturally yield the most positive attitudes and negative the
least. We do however report these data in the methodological appendix, for
completeness.Less-dialectical people tend to pursue a single truth and have a
preference for consistency.
We note here that dialecticism has been shown to be different
from constructs such as collectivism/individualism (Triandis,
1995), interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991),
and preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom,
1995). It should also be clearly noted that while dialecticism has
been established as a thinking style, this does not mean that high
dialectics process information in a more heuristic, top-down
manner (versus more systematically). On the contrary, research
has shown that high dialectics often search for and use more
information, in forming judgments, than low dialectics (e.g., Choi,
Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park, 2003; Monga & John, 2008). High
dialectics are also more likely to ascribe causality to situational
factors and to multiple actors; low dialectics hold individual actors
responsible.
Given its importance, dialecticism has been studied in social
psychology for many years, e.g., in the literatures on self-esteem
(Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004), cross-cultural
psychology (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010), and emotional
experience (Miyamoto, Uchida, & Ellsworth, 2010). However,
its use is very limited in consumer research. Mick and Fournier
(1998) described consumers' responses to new technology as
dialectical, both “a blessing and a curse,” but did not measure
this construct. A partial conceptualization of dialecticism, the
propensity to accept duality, was operationalized by Williams
and Aaker (2002), but only through cultural background (Anglo
or Asian American) and age. This has obvious limitations
because it potentially confounds the across-culture difference in
duality with other un-controlled differences (Aaker & Sengupta,
2000, p.70, footnote 3; Williams & Aaker, 2002, p. 645).Attitudinal ambivalence
Many topics in life evoke evaluative reactions that are
simultaneously both positive and negative, and thus conflicting
(e.g., toward immigration or nuclear energy). We adopt the
terminology of Spencer-Rodgers et al. (2004) to define ambivalent
attitudes as those that simultaneously contain evaluations of both
positive and negative valence (the coexistence of evaluative
opposites). This requires the simultaneous accessibility of both the
positive and negative components of attitude (Newby-Clark,
McGregor, & Zanna, 2002).
Previous researchers have conceptualized and measured
attitudinal ambivalence in two different ways (Priester & Petty,
1996). Objective (or intrinsic) ambivalence concerns the extent
to which the inherent characteristics of the message are
capable of evoking separate positive and negative evaluations
(e.g., Sengupta & Johar, 2002, p. 46; Williams & Aaker,
2002, p. 640). Thus, measures of objective ambivalence assess
the positive and negative assessments of the attitude object's
properties separately and then combine them, using mathematical
models (Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; see Appendix).
Since objective ambivalence refers to characteristics of the
message itself, not experienced feelings, it is relatively unaffected
by situational/contextual factors—including the degree to which
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a measure of the strength of our information-type manipulations.
The second type of attitudinal ambivalence—felt
ambivalence—becomes our logical outcome. This type of
ambivalence concerns how much a particular respondent
actually experiences contradictory feelings toward the object,
because it is perceived to contain contradictory elements in that
particular situation (Newby-Clark et al., 2002; Priester & Petty,
1996; van Harreveld et al., 2009). Priester and Petty (2001)
point out that felt ambivalence is affected not just by message
characteristics (e.g., objective ambivalence) but also by
intrapersonal factors (e.g., conflict between current and desired
attitudes) and by interpersonal situational factors (e.g., the
discrepancy between one's own attitudes and close others'
attitudes). Thus, there are other determinants of felt ambiva-
lence besides the extent of objective ambivalence. Felt
ambivalence is measured by asking individuals about the
extent to which their felt attitudes toward an attitude object are
one-sided or mixed (Priester & Petty, 1996).
Naturally, when the presented information is itself mixed in
nature (such as a user-generated review in online media),
both positive and negative attitudinal components should be
accessible, creating felt ambivalence. Importantly, however,
Priester et al. (2007) demonstrated that even when presented
with univalent information that does not evoke any (or few)
conflicting reactions right away, some consumers can believe
that there might exist product information or attributes, of the
opposite valence, of which they are presently unaware—and
thus still feel ambivalence, because of “anticipated conflicting
reactions” (hereafter, ACRs). Priester et al. (2007), p.12),
“many people recognize that there are often two sides to every
story and that nothing is perfect (or completely worthless).”
They argue that these ACRs should occur mostly when people
are unaware of any specific attributes that are opposite to their
dominant reactions—so that ACRs should not arise when
consumers are explicitly presented with both the positive and
negative sides of an argument (as in our mixed information
messages, below), but only when consumers are presented with
information of only one valence. Therefore, in our studies
below, we argue and show that univalent, not just mixed,
information can create felt ambivalence.
Priester et al. (2007) conceptualized an ACR as being
a thought or belief about the existence of missing information
of the opposite valence. They measured ACRs by asking
participants, “To what extent do you anticipate that the product
has negative (positive) qualities and attributes that you don‘t
know about?”3 While such a thought is a type of cognitive
response (CR), it is not one in which a claim in the incoming
message is either supported or countered concerning its accuracy.
Rather, an ACR focuses on the completeness of information
(e.g., do I have enough information about this product?), in
particular the completeness of information that is of the valence3 The specific scales were anchored with zero equal to “do not anticipate any
negative (positive) qualities and attributes” and 10 equal to “anticipate many
negative (positive) qualities and attributes.” For further details about these
ACRs, see Priester et al. (2007, p.12).opposite to that of the information actually presented (Rucker,
Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2014, p.123). Because they reflect
concerns about completeness, not accuracy, ACRs are not
indicators of skepticism or (lack of) trustworthiness of the
presented information. Rucker et al. (2014) show that such an
ACR-type concern about the completeness of the information
presented can decrease attitude certainty, while the usual support
and counter argumentation, or the source derogation cognitive
responses that reflect concerns about trustworthiness, should
affect attitude valence. However, while ACRs are thus different
from the usual CRs in content, they should still be like CRs in that
both require cognitive effort, thus high motivation and ability to
process and respond; both are thus more likely and numerous
when incoming information is negative rather than positive,
provoking more systematic processing overall (see below).
Priester et al. (2007) found that these ACRs mediated the
effect of the number of product attributes on felt ambivalence.
Earlier data in Priester and Petty (2001) also supports the
ambivalence-creating effects of such ACRs evoked by receiving
univalent messages. Thus we argue below that the generation of
ACRs, not broader overall CR production (or the degree of
systematic processing, or involvement) is most related to the level
of felt ambivalence.
Felt ambivalence for different types of messages: Low dialectics
For low dialectics responding to mixed vs. univalent messages,
the literature suggests two opposing hypotheses. On the one hand,
given their definitional low tolerance for contradiction, it could be
argued that mixed information will elicit more ambivalent feelings
than univalent information, since positive and negative attitudinal
components are more accessible jointly in mixed than in univalent
information. Prior literature has shown that felt ambivalence
increases with the simultaneous accessibility of both positive
and negative attitudinal components (Newby-Clark et al., 2002).
Empirical evidence exists that low dialectics (Anglo-Americans)
feel more ambivalence when facing mixed, than univalent,
information (Williams & Aaker, 2002).
On the other hand, our literature review suggests that
positive and negative univalent messages can also create high
felt ambivalence for consumers, because the ACRs that create
felt ambivalence appear mostly for univalent, and not mixed,
messages (Priester et al., 2007, p.12; Rucker et al., 2014).
However, this second theoretical expectation comes with a
crucial caveat. Priester et al. (2007, p.12) point out that these
ACRs that create felt ambivalence are more likely among
individuals who “recognize there are often two sides to every
story.” Low dialectics should thus not be likely to generate
ACRs to univalent messages, and then feel ambivalence.
Should this moderation of ACR generation and felt ambiva-
lence by low dialecticism occur equally strongly for both positive
and negative univalent messages? Recent literature suggests this
should not be so. As much prior research has shown, negative
information is usually less ambiguous and more diagnostic, for
product judgments, than positive or neutral cues (Herr, Kardes, &
Kim, 1991, p.460; Schwarz & Bless, 1991, p.61; Skowronski &
Carlston, 1989, p.134); thus, it should receive more processing.
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higher level of risk and danger, and a lower level of safety
(Schwarz & Bless, 1991, p.60); it is thus adaptively better to
process and weight negative information more than positive
information (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs,
2001). These characteristics lead to a reduced reliance on simple
heuristics and more detailed processing, when negative (versus
positive) information is received. Prior research also shows the
asymmetric processing of information when consumers are in
positive vs. negative states of mind or affective states, with
negative states of mind triggering deeper and more systematic
processing (e.g., Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
Thus, all these streams of literature support the expectation
that—as a “main effect”—univalent negative information should
trigger more systematic processing than univalent positive
information should, leading to more CR production of all types.
Thus for low dialectics (as with high dialectics, see below),
negative information should evoke more systematic processing
(thus more total CR production overall) than positive messages.
However, since low dialectics are not expecting a different side to
the presented story, these increased CRs for low dialectics should
be of the same valence as that of the incoming message
information, not ACRs concerning opposite-valence information.
The number of ACRs about opposite-valence information for low
dialectics should thus be no higher for negative than for positive
univalent messages. As a result, felt ambivalence should also
not be higher for low dialectics just because the incoming
information is negative (vs. positive): it should be at low, roughly
equal levels, for both. Thus:
H1a. For low dialectics, mixed information will cause a high
degree of felt ambivalence, while both negative and positive
information messages will cause a low degree of felt ambivalence
(with no difference between them).Felt ambivalence for different types of messages: High dialectics
For high dialectics, it might initially seem that since they
expect the world to be full of contradictions, they should feel
little ambivalence when presented with mixed information
messages. However, further analysis shows even high dialectics
should find such mixed messages difficult to evaluate and pass
judgment on, since they can easily see that it explicitly contains
within itself both positive and negative elements—readily
apparent (explicit, clear, definite) contradictions, to use the
terminology of Peng and Nisbett (1999). Thus mixed information
messages should create a high degree of felt ambivalence (a
mixed evaluative reaction, with coexisting evaluative opposites)
even for high dialectics.
Note that this expected response by high dialectics to mixed
information messages is similar to the expectation above for
low dialectics. Such equivalence in response by high and low
dialectics to obviously mixed information has in fact been shown
in prior research on cross-cultural differences in emotional
responses to mixed-information stimuli. For example, Miyamoto
et al. (2010, study 2) found that both high dialectics (Japanese)
and low dialectics (Americans) form the same level of mixedemotions (i.e., feel positive emotion and negative emotions at the
same time) when they were asked to recall a mixed situation (i.e.,
“the day you started classes in college”). Further, Williams and
Aaker (2002) also found no evidence that high-dialectical
thinkers experienced less mixed emotions than low dialectical
thinkers, when they viewed an advertisement designed to elicit
mixed (“bittersweet”) emotions.
Next, how should high dialectics respond to univalent
(purely positive or negative) information? Since high dialectics
expect more (than low dialectics do) that information exists of
an opposing nature, the CRs they generate for any message
should contain many ACRs, concerning the valence opposite to
that of the message information. For a negative-only informa-
tion message, that triggers more systematic processing, high
dialectics should thus produce many more ACRs containing
self-generated positive thoughts, coexisting with the negative
message-generated thoughts. In this case, high dialectics
should see a high level of potential contradiction, between
the negative-only information clearly stated within the message,
and their own self-generated ACRs about the positive informa-
tion that the message could, but does not, contain. As with the
high level of apparent (obvious) contradiction seen in the
mixed-information messages, the high level of potential contra-
diction seen with the negative message should create high felt
ambivalence, since both types of contradiction make positive and
negative attitudes simultaneously accessible (Newby-Clark et al.,
2002). Thus high dialectics should have high levels of ACRs and
felt ambivalence for negative information as well, not just mixed.
For positive information messages, high dialectics should
again be likely to have many ACRs involving thoughts of the
opposite (i.e., negative) valence, given their more-questioning
nature. However, the total number of these ACRs about
opposite-valence information should still be relatively low, since
the overall level of systematic processing is lower for positive
messages than for negative ones, even for high dialectics, per the
previously cited research on total systematic processing levels.
Thus, felt ambivalence should still be lower for them than for
negative information. Thus
H1b. For high dialectics, both mixed and negative information
messages will cause a high degree of felt ambivalence (with no
difference between them), while positive information messages
will lead to a low degree of felt ambivalence.
Since ACR generation, our theoretically justified process
that creates these levels of felt ambivalence, should occur
mostly when consumers see univalent positive or negative (but
not mixed) information (Priester et al., 2007, p.12), our
theoretical arguments also imply:
H2a. For low dialectics, both negative and positive information
messages will cause a low number of ACRs about opposite-
valence information (with no difference between them).
H2b. For high dialectics, negative information messages will
cause a high number of ACRs, while positive information
messages will lead to a low number of such ACRs.
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univalent information (positive vs. negative) on felt ambiva-
lence, but only for high-dialectical consumers, not low.
Discomfort
We now develop our hypotheses for discomfort. It has long
been assumed that resolution of inconsistency is the natural
goal for all consumers, because attitudinal ambivalence is
associated with psychic tension (Festinger, 1957). Consumer
research has, therefore, tended to equate felt ambivalence with
feelings of discomfort—a state where one feels uncomfortable,
tense, etc. Harmon-Jones (2000) describes discomfort as a
negative feeling of being uncomfortable, sad, anxious, uneasy,
and bothered. Consistent with this conceptualization, Williams
and Aaker (2002) measured feelings of discomfort using three
items of conflicted, confused, and uncomfortable. However,
because of the assumed overlap of discomfort with felt
ambivalence, the first two items they used are also present in
the earlier five-item scale of felt ambivalence in Priester and
Petty's (1996); Priester & Petty, 2001). Similarly, Priester et al.
(2007) use a five-item attitude ambivalence scale that combines
items for felt ambivalence with an item measuring felt tension.
We argue here, however, that felt ambivalence should be
treated as a construct that is distinct from discomfort, because
the relationship between the two should itself vary with the
consumer's level of dialecticism. Felt ambivalence describes
the feeling of difficulty in making an overall evaluation or
decision because of the presence or absence of conflicting or
contradictory information in the attitude object. Therefore (as in
H1a), felt ambivalence ought to be greater when the consumer
is faced with mixed (versus univalent) information about the
attitude object. But discomfort is a distinctly separate state, going
beyond current or anticipated decision difficulty: it is a negative
feeling of being uncomfortable, sad, anxious, uneasy, and
bothered (Harmon-Jones, 2000). Evidence for this distinction
can be found in a study by van Harreveld et al. (2009), in which
inconsistent stimulus information always led to felt ambivalence
but was related to physiological discomfort only when a choice
(for or against the attitudinal issue) actually had to be made.
Sengupta and Johar (2002) add to the argument for separation
by showing that consumers vary in the felt need to resolve
inconsistent attitudes: not all consumers who feel ambivalence
need also feel discomfort.
Therefore, in contrast to the equivalence assumed between
them in the prior literature, we propose that the relation between
ambivalence and discomfort itself ought to vary with the level of
dialecticism. Peng and Nisbett (1999, p.750) report that among
(low dialectical) Americans, “there is a strong desire to generate
counter arguments against a position that one doubts, in order
to find a more secure basis for belief in some other position”
(emphasis added). They point out that this strong desire is much
reduced in (high dialectical) Asian cultures, which are more
expecting of apparently contradictory facts. Further, Nisbett et al.
(2001) report that the Americans “felt substantial pressure to
resolve the contradiction” presented to them (302) while “the
Chinese developed a dialectic … which involves reconciling,transcending or even accepting apparent contradictions” (294,
emphasis added).
Given this prior theorizing and evidence, we expect that
low-dialectics (e.g., Westerners) receiving a mixed-information
message should feel a heightened motivation to resolve the
inconsistency or contradiction seen in that mixed message, and
thus experience more “strong desire” and “substantial pressure”
to resolve the contradictions they see in it (than high dialectics).
Thus, a mixed-information message should create a high level of
consequent tension and discomfort among low dialectics. Other
studies also document that low dialectics feel a high level of
discomfort in response to mixed information (e.g., Williams &
Aaker, 2002). When facing univalent (positive- or negative-only)
information, since they do not see anything troubling with a
one-sided world, low dialectics should not be motivated to
generate ACRs in response, or feel pressured to resolve and
explain what they are seeing. As a result, low dialectics should
not only experience less felt ambivalence but also feel less
discomfort. Thus:
H4a. For low dialectics, mixed-information messages will
cause a high degree of discomfort, while negative and positive
information messages will both cause a low degree of discomfort
(with no difference between them).
We now examine what should happen, in terms of discomfort,
for higher dialecticism consumers when they face different
types of messages. For mixed-information messages, recall our
statement earlier that such a message explicitly includes both
positive and negative elements, thus visibly containing within
itself what Peng and Nisbett (1999) called apparent contradic-
tion. For such mixed-information messages, the self-apparent
nature of the contradiction matches what high dialectics expect to
find around them. High dialectics—for whom such a mixed state
of the world should appear reasonable and normal—should
thus be highly likely to accept and tolerate the contradictory
facts contained in the message (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999;
Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004), so that such mixed-information
messages should not create high desire- or pressure-to-resolve
in high dialectics, and therefore not create high tension and
discomfort. Supporting this line of argument, Choi and Nisbett
(2000) have shown that Korean participants (high dialectics)
display less surprise and greater hindsight bias than American
participants (low dialectics) do, when a target's behavior clearly
contradicts expectations.
What should be the levels of discomfort felt by high
dialectics for univalent information messages? For positive
information, we argued in H1b and H2b that high dialectics
should be less likely to generate ACRs, thus only creating low
levels of felt ambivalence. Since the level of felt ambivalence is
at low levels, high dialectics should also experience just a low
need to resolve the felt ambivalence, and thus not experience a
high level of discomfort either.
For messages with purely negative information, however,
high dialectics are likely to have generated a high level of ACRs
(H2b) and thus feel more ambivalence (H1b). Importantly, when
these high dialectics get negative-only information, the ACRs
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information should be accompanied by greater felt uncertainty,
than would be felt from positive-valence arguments explicitly
contained within a mixed-information message. That is, in the
mixed-message case, both the negative and positive arguments are
explicit within the message itself, presenting a self-apparent and
definite contradiction, thus evoking low uncertainty. However, in
the negative-only message case, the message-presented negative
information is explicit and certain, while the self-generated
positive thoughts (via the ACRs) are more conjectural and
uncertain, creating what we earlier called potential (but not
for-sure) contradiction. High dialectics should therefore experi-
ence more unease and discomfort from a negative-only message
than from a mixed-information message—even though their level
of felt ambivalence should be the same across these two types of
messages (see H1b).4 Thus:
H4b. For high dialectics, negative information messages will
cause a high degree of discomfort, while mixed and positive
information messages will both lead to a low degree of
discomfort (with no difference between them).
While our hypotheses above concerning the differential
responses by high dialectics to positive-only versus negative-
only messages have been developed on the basis of substantial
theory and prior empirical results, we acknowledge that
alternative possibilities exist, especially with regard to underlying
processes. Hence we will explore multiple process possibilities in
our second study, and explore non-hypothesized outcomes in our
testing.Mediation of discomfort effects by felt ambivalence
When we combine H1 with H4, we can see that for low
dialectics, the influence of message information type on felt
ambivalence, and on discomfort, shows a consistently parallel
pattern, with mixed information causing both greater felt
ambivalence and greater discomfort than positive or negative.4 It might be asked why the potential contradiction in the negative-only
message (via ACRs) works differently than the explicit contradiction in the
mixed message, such that for high dialectics the negative-only message creates
more discomfort but not more felt ambivalence. As argued earlier, felt
ambivalence is caused by the simultaneous accessibility of positive and
negative thoughts (Newby-Clark et al., 2002), while discomfort is caused by the
pressure to resolve apparent contradictions (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Thus while
felt ambivalence is related to information accessibility, discomfort is related to
information certainty. Prior research has shown (Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker,
2007) that attitude certainty is distinct from (though related to) attitude
accessibility (p. 31). Therefore, for high dialectics, for both mixed and negative-
only messages, both positive and negative information are simultaneously
accessible (in the case of negative-only messages, this happens via the ACRs;
for mixed messages, via the explicit information presented), creating high felt
ambivalence in both. But the level of uncertainty, and thus discomfort, is higher
in the negative information message than in the mixed message: the opposite-
valence ACR-generated thoughts in the former are uncertain, while the
explicitly-presented information in the latter is apparent/explicit and thus
certain.This means that, for low dialectics, the effect of information
type on discomfort should be mediated by felt ambivalence,
driven by the comparisons between mixed versus negative, and
mixed versus positive, but not between negative and positive
information.
The expected pattern of results is different for high dialectics.
For them, positive information should not create higher felt
ambivalence, but both mixed and negative information should. In
terms of discomfort, positive information should not create high
discomfort, nor should mixed. Discomfort should, however, be
high for these high dialectics from negative information. As a
result, the mediating role of felt ambivalence should only emerge
for them in the comparison between negative and positive, and
not in the comparisons between mixed and negative, or mixed
and positive conditions. Prior research does not expect such
moderated mediation (Hayes, 2013), because it equates the
effects of information type on felt ambivalence with those on
discomfort and does not expect moderation of these by
dialecticism. Formally:
H5. There exists a moderated mediation effect, with felt
ambivalence mediating the link from product information type to
discomfort, and with dialecticism moderating this mediation
process. For low dialectics, this mediating effect is driven by the
comparisons between the mixed versus univalent, but not
between negative and positive conditions; for high dialectics,
this mediating effect is driven by the comparisons between the
negative and positive condition, and not in the comparisons
between the mixed and univalent conditions.
Overview of experiments
We will test our hypotheses through three studies. In the first
study, we will manipulate dialecticism and examine its moderat-
ing role in the relationship of information type, felt ambivalence,
and discomfort. Study 2, limiting itself to a comparison of positive
versus negative univalent messages, tests the proposed process
mechanism of ACRs and also rules out several plausible
alternative process explanations. Different from the first two
studies that present participants with specific attribute-based
product information, our third study presents them with summary
product quality information (customer satisfaction ratings) and
examines whether the conclusions from the first two studies can
be generalized to this context.
Experiment 1
Design and procedure
This experiment used a 3 (information type: positive vs. mixed
vs. negative) × 2 (dialecticism: high vs. low) between-subjects
design. Participants were told that a new MP3 player was going
to be launched into the market soon, and its manufacturer was
investigating usage patterns and attitudes of university students,
who were their target customers. 158 Chinese university students
participated, for nominal monetary compensation ($2.00).
The main experiment had three parts. First, we used a method
that combined proverb completion and paragraph-length stories
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proverbs were presented at the top of the first page of priming
materials (high dialectical example: “Sorrow is born of excessive
joy”; low dialectical example: “As you sow, so shall you reap”).
Participants were required to fill in one missing word in each
proverb and then in the bottom line write down only one common
meaning that all five proverbs seemed to share. The second
page of priming materials used a paragraph-length story recall
technique. Here, the second half of the first sentence in the
paragraph used the expression “as the proverb ‘x’ implies” to
strengthen the association between the two tasks of proverb
completion and the paragraph, and to increase the strength of the
priming manipulation. The high-dialectical priming materials
were intended to activate greater tolerance of contradictions
and to create thoughts of two-sided resolution (i.e., there is no
right answer); the low-dialectical priming materials were
intended to activate the law of non-contradiction (i.e., there
was a very clear and single answer). We used an independent
pretest (n = 45, male = 20) to validate the manipulation
(details of these materials and the pretest are in the methodolog-
ical appendix).
Second, we manipulated the stimulus product attribute
information to be either purely positive, purely negative, or
mixed. The four attributes of the MP3 player on which
information was provided (randomly rotated) were tone quality,
hours of use, storage capability, and degree of operational
convenience. The positive information condition showed that
all four attributes were rated five stars and had positive
descriptions of all four attributes. The negative information was
rated at the one-star level. In the mixed-information condition,
two attributes of Yiven were rated five stars and the other two
rated one star, such that the number of positive and negative
attributes were equalized (Sengupta & Johar, 2002). After
reading the manipulated description, participants were asked
questions about the dependent variables of felt ambivalence and
discomfort (objective ambivalence was measured as a manip-
ulation check).
Measures
Objective ambivalence was measured by six 4-point scales
about the stimulus product (Kaplan, 1972): “favorable/
unfavorable,” “positive/negative,” and “beneficial/harmful”
(α = .83 and .90 for the favorable and unfavorable stimuli).
The values of objective ambivalence computed via the SIM,
CRM, and GTM models (see appendix) yielded similar results,
and only the SIM results are reported for brevity. For felt
ambivalence, participants used three statements to report their
feelings about the stimulus product (1 = not at all conflicted/not
at all mixed/not at all indecisive, 7 = very conflicted/very mixed/
very indecisive; α = .72), following Priester and Petty (1996).
Discomfortwas measured via three items, uncomfortable/uneasy/
bothered (Harmon-Jones, 2000), on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all
felt, 5 = strongly felt; α = .81). In this experiment (as in the
later 2), the multi-item scales for felt ambivalence and discomfort
correlated moderately (.32, p b .01), and clearly loaded on
different factors in an EFA.Results
Manipulation checks
In addition to conducting the pretest (see appendix), we also
used other indicators to examine whether our dialecticism
manipulation was working as intended. (Details appear in the
Appendix, adjacent to the description of the manipulation.)
These tests showed that the proverbs we were using were
appropriate and familiar to our participants and were equally
trustworthy across conditions. Thus, our proverb completion
task appears to be a valid and non-confounded priming
technique. The manipulation of product attribute information
type was also successful. Results revealed that there was only
a main effect of information type on objective ambivalence
(F(2, 152) = 21.31, p b .001), with mixed-information expo-
sure causing a higher level (M = 1.98, by the SIM model) than
positive (M = 1.05; t(155) = −6.40, p b .001) and negative
(M = 1.23; t(155) = −5.07, p b .001). There was no signifi-
cant difference across the positive vs. negative conditions
(t(155) = −1.28, p N .10).
Felt ambivalence
There was a significant interaction of information type by
dialecticism (F(2, 152) = 6.11, p b .01). Contrast comparisons
revealed that for low dialectics, mixed information evoked
significantly higher levels of felt ambivalence (M = 4.39) than
negative (M = 2.81; F(1, 152) = 22.05, p b .001) as well as
positive (M = 3.08; F(1, 152) = 13.58, p b .001). Further, there
was no significant difference between the positive and negative
conditions (F1, 152) b 1, p N .10). Thus, H1a was supported.
However, for high dialectics, mixed information was not
significantly different than negative (Mmixed = 4.01, Mnegative =
3.96; F(1, 152) b 1, p N .10). Mixed information caused greater
felt ambivalence than positive (M = 3.03; F(1152) = 10.57,
p b .001), and negative information evoked greater felt ambiv-
alence than positive (F(1152) = 9.03, p b .01). H1b is supported.
Discomfort
Analysis showed that there existed a significant interaction
effect of information type by dialecticism (F(2, 152) = 4.58,
p b .05). Contrast analysis revealed that for low dialectics,
mixed information (M = 2.80) created significantly more
discomfort than both positive (M = 2.06; F(1, 152) = 10.70,
p b .001) and negative (M = 2.25, F(1, 152) = 6.42, p b .05).
There was no significant difference between positive and
negative information (F(1, 152) b 1, p N .05), supporting H4a.
For high dialectics, there was no significant difference in
discomfort between mixed (M = 2.34) and positive information
(M = 2.15; F(1, 152) = 1.04, p N .05). But negative informa-
tion caused more discomfort than did positive (Mnegative = 2.68,
Mpositive = 2.15; F(1, 125) = 7.47, p b .01) and marginally
more discomfort than mixed (Mmixed = 2.34; F(1152) = 2.82,
p = .09). Therefore, H4b finds support, but only at p b .10.
Moderated mediation
We used a bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure with a
multi-categorical independent variable (5000 samples; Hayes,
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ambivalence → discomfort, separately for higher and lower
dialecticism. For low dialectics, we had predicted that the
mediation of felt ambivalence only exists when comparing
positive versus mixed, and negative versus mixed conditions. So
we created two dummy variables to capture the three experimen-
tal conditions, with mixed information as the baseline condition.
The analysis showed that the effect of information type on
discomfort was mediated by felt ambivalence (95%; β = −.26,
CI excluding zero, from −.62 to −.03) in the comparison between
the positive and mixed-information conditions, as also in the
comparison between negative and mixed conditions (95%;
β = −.31, CI excluding zero, from −.73 to −.02). Furthermore,
the direct effects of information type on discomfort in these
two comparisons were not significantly different (respectively,
β = −.47, CI including zero, from −.99 to .04; β = −.23, CI
including zero, from −.75 to .28), indicating the presence
of indirect-only mediation. Positive and negative messages
evoked the same level of felt ambivalence and discomfort,
making mediation tests unnecessary.
For high dialectics, we expect mediation by felt ambivalence
only when comparing positive and negative information. The
same bootstrapping analysis (5000 samples; Hayes, 2013,
model 4) revealed mediation when comparing these conditions
(95%; β = .11, CI excluding zero, from .01 to .29). The direct
effect was significant (95%; β = .42, CI excluding zero, from
.04 to .80), indicating complementary mediation. Since high
dialectics formed the same level of felt ambivalence in negative
and mixed conditions, and the same level of discomfort in
positive and mixed conditions, mediation tests across these
conditions were unnecessary. H5 finds support.
Discussion
This first experiment shows that for low dialectics, mixed
information causes greater felt ambivalence and discomfort
than univalent negative or positive information, in line with
prior research (Priester & Petty, 1996, 2001; Sengupta & Johar,
2002; Williams & Aaker, 2002). But it also extends prior
research by additionally showing that for high dialectics,
negative-only information causes the same high level of felt
ambivalence, and even more discomfort, than mixed informa-
tion (with positive information having both least ambivalence
and discomfort). As well, the experiment demonstrates the
dissociation between felt ambivalence and discomfort for high
dialectics. It then provides evidence for moderated mediation.
Two issues remain after this first experiment. First, while the
results support our outcome expectations of H1, H4, and H5,
they do not provide any process evidence that it is ACRs that
are creating the felt ambivalence in the univalent information
conditions, as our theory development above (H2, H3) argued.
Second, the prior study does not rule out some alternative
process explanations that might explain the asymmetrical
effects between the positive and negative information condi-
tions. Are high dialectics simply more skeptical about the
presented negative information, leading to more uncertainty
about its validity (and more conflicting reactions), thus creatingmore felt ambivalence? Were the high dialectics—more
expecting of change and more tolerant of
contradictions—simply more optimistic than the lower
dialecticism consumers, thus evoking more conflicting positive
thoughts to the negative information, creating more felt
ambivalence? Were high dialectics simply processing the
negative messages with greater effort and involvement? In
order to test these alternative explanations, the next study
measured participants' trust in the product descriptions, their
optimism, and their involvement. Since the more interesting
results of the first study are those involving the negative vs.




This experiment used a 2 (manipulated dialecticism: high vs.
low) × 2 (information type: positive vs. negative) between-subject
design. 105 undergraduate Chinese students were recruited (paid
$2.00) and randomly assigned into four groups. The procedure and
materials were similar to experiment 1. A new product category
(electronic tablet “Pads”) was used. Participants firstly completed
the same manipulation of dialecticism as in Study 1, then saw a
Pad's description (four pretested attributes: storage capability,
running speed, weight, and the degree of friendly interface) and
finally completed the desired measures. Participants first
provided their response to three valence measures (1 = bad/
negative/unfavorable, 7 = good/positive/favorable, α = .97),
used as the information valence manipulation check, and then
provided measures of felt ambivalence (α = .64) and discom-
fort (α = .89).
We measured anticipated conflicting responses (ACRs)
through a rating item: for the negative (positive)-information
condition, “Did you suspect that there was some positive
(negative) information about this Pad that was not presented in
the message?” (1 = never thought that, 7 = fully thought that).
This single item is very similar to the single item used by Priester
et al. (2007): “To what extent do you anticipate that the (brand)
has some positive (negative) qualities and attributes that you
don't know about?” Finally, respondents answered questions
about involvement in the task (two items, r = .57), the extent to
which they trusted the information in the stimuli (three items,
α = .92), and their levels of optimism at that time (six items, α =
.54). Details appear in the methodological appendix.
Results
Manipulation checks
We used the valence of responses to the stimulus information
as our message information valence manipulation check. There
was only a significant main effect of information valence:
respondents rated the positive information message more
favorably (M = 5.49) than they did the negative (M = 3.14;
F(1, 101) = 115.07, p b .001). Since our dialecticism manip-
ulation had already been successfully pretested and used, and
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items, we elected to not use that scale within this study.
ACRs
First, there was a main effect of information type (F(1, 101) =
8.76, p b .01), with consumers reporting larger numbers on
the ACR rating scale when they faced negative information
(M = 4.96) than positive (M = 3.69). This is consistent with
the voluminous prior research, cited earlier in our theoretical
development, showing more systematic processing overall in
response to negative (versus positive) information. Second, this
main effect was moderated by dialecticism (F(1, 101) = 3.24,
p = .075). As expected (H2a), low dialectics reported the same
relatively lower level of ACRs when given either negative
or positive information (Mnegative = 4.42 vs.Mpositive = 3.93, F(1,
101) b 1, p N .40). In contrast (supporting H2b), high dialectics
had a higher value on the ACR reporting scale in the negative
than in the positive condition (5.48 vs. 3.44, F(1, 101) = 11.35,
p b .01). From another perspective, in the negative information
condition, high dialectics had higher levels on the ACR scale
(5.48) than low dialectics (4.42, F(1, 101) = 3.22, p = .076),
while in contrast, there was no significant difference in the positive
information condition (Mhigher dia. = 3.44 vs. Mlower dia. = 3.93,
F(1, 101) b 1, p N .47). See Fig. 1.
Felt ambivalence
Replicating earlier results, there was a significant interaction
effect of information type by dialecticism (F(1101) = 8.25,
p b .01). Further analyses revealed that for high dialectics,
negative information evoked more felt ambivalence (M = 3.80)
than positive (M = 2.95; F(1, 101) = 6.34, p = 0.013). In
contrast, for low dialectics, there was no significant difference
of felt ambivalence between the positive and negative
information conditions (Mpositive = 3.32 vs. Mnegative = 2.78;
F(1, 101) = 2.42, p N .12).
Discomfort
The interaction effect of information exposure and dialecticism
was significant (F(1, 101) = 5.49, p = 0.02). Simple effect tests
revealed that for high dialectics, negative information did lead to
more (M = 2.65) discomfort than positive (M = 1.80; F(1101) =
12.53, p = 0.001). For low dialectics, there was no significant
difference in discomfort between these two conditions
(Mpositive = 1.93 vs. Mnegative = 1.97; F(1101) b 1, p = .83).
Process testing: ACRs to felt ambivalence
To test the mediating role of ACRs on felt ambivalence
(H3), we used a bias-corrected bootstrapping method (5000
samples; Hayes, 2013, model 7). For high dialectics, we found
that the ACRs mediated the effect of information type on felt
ambivalence (β = −.24, 95% CI = −.62 to −.035). Further, the
direct effect of information type on felt ambivalence was not
significant (β = −.0088, 95% CI = −.52 to .50), indicating
indirect-only mediation. In contrast, such mediation by ACRs
was not supported for low dialectics (β = −.06, 95% CI = −.32
to .06). Thus, our process data on ACRs support our theory-based
expectations for felt ambivalence (H3).Moderated mediation
Since ACRs were proposed earlier as the reason why
high—but not low—dialectics felt more ambivalence, and
consequently more discomfort, we next tested the complete
process model (information type → ACRs → felt ambivalence
→ discomfort) using the bootstrapping method (5000 samples;
Hayes, 2013, model 6). We predicted that the proposed process
sequence would only find support among high dialectics. As
Fig. 2 shows, the effect of information type on discomfort was
indeed mediated by ACRs and felt ambivalence (95%; β = −
.07, CI excluding zero, from −.30 to −.004) for high dialectics,
with the direct effect being significant (β = −.77, CI excluding
zero, from −1.29 to −.24), indicating complementary media-
tion. However, as expected, this process model did not find
support among low dialectics (95%; β = −.003, CI including
zero, from −.05 to .01), supporting H5.
Ruling out alternative accounts
One alternative explanation for our experimental results could
be that high dialectics were simply more distrusting about our
focal product's negative-only information description, leading to
more uncertainty and doubt about the product's qualities, causing
higher felt ambivalence and discomfort. However, two additional
mediation analyses showed that for high dialectics, after
controlling for the level of message trustworthiness via our
measure, ACRs still mediated the effect of information type on
felt ambivalence and discomfort. Nor did our trustworthiness
measure itself mediate the effect of information type on felt
ambivalence. We also tested whether high dialectics—more
expecting of change and more tolerant of contradictions—were
simply more optimistic than low dialectics, thus evoking
more conflicting positive thoughts when presented with the
negative-only information, leading to more felt ambivalence.
Mediation tests of the process of information type → optimism
→ felt ambivalence showed that in neither high nor low dialectics
are these mediating optimism processes significant.
A third rival explanation could be that high dialectics—who
should expect more, and thus search more, for conflicting
information—simply processed the negative message with
more involvement and effort, thus producing more ACRs,
leading to more felt ambivalence. We had argued that it was
ACRs in particular, and not the overall level of systematic
processing, or involvement, that led to felt ambivalence. In our
data, we did find higher involvement levels when greater
systematic processing might be expected overall: high dialec-
tics have a marginally higher involvement in negative than in
positive information conditions, while low dialectics reported
the same and relatively lower level of involvement in both
negative and positive information conditions. We then tested
the possibility that involvement mediated the effects of
information valence on the number of ACRs produced, and
then on the level of felt ambivalence, for high dialectics.
However, these mediation tests showed that for high dialectics,
the process of information type → involvement → ACRs →
felt ambivalence is not significant. Details of all these tests are
omitted here for brevity but are available upon request. In short,





























































EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF DIALECTICISM AND INFORMATION TYPE ON ACRs, 
FELT AMBIVALENCE, DISCOMFORT











Note: t-values are given in parentheses. Asterisked
EXPERIMENT 2:THE MEDIATING PROC
CONSUMER
Fig. 2. Experiment 2: The mediating proce
390 H. Wang et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 26, 3 (2016) 381–394framework, that ACRs drove the asymmetric effect of negative
versus positive information, among high dialectics, in creating
higher felt ambivalence and discomfort.
Discussion
The results of this second study make several additional
contributions. Beyond replicating the earlier effects on felt
ambivalence and discomfort in a new product category, they
provide support for the proposed underlying processes, in two
ways. First, our measure here of consumers' ACRs provided
supporting evidence for our proposed mechanism. Second, our
measures here of consumers' level of trust in the presented
information, and their levels of optimism and task involvement,
allowed us to rule out some possible alternative process
explanations, further increasing our confidence in our underly-
ing theoretical framework.
Some further issues remain, addressed below in our final
Study 3. The stimuli employed in the two prior experiments for
information type used specific, rather than summary, attribute
information. Though such a manipulation of information has
become a tradition in the attitudinal ambivalence and related
research traditions (Sengupta & Johar, 2002), there is also
widespread use of summary or overall information (such as
ratings by Consumer Reports, J.D. Power, etc.) by consumers,
so we used such ratings here. Second, within these stimuli, we
manipulated information inconsistency (mixed vs. univalent
information) by presenting a conflicting (versus uniform)




With 155 undergraduate students from a major Chinese
university participating in this experiment, we again used a 3
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391H. Wang et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 26, 3 (2016) 381–394(dialecticism: high versus low) between-subjects design. We
told participants that a new MP3 player brand, Yiven, was
going to be launched into the market soon, for which the
company was conducting research. The experimental proce-
dures were similar to those of Experiment 1.
The priming technique and materials for dialecticism were
similar to those for Experiment 1, but the stimulus manipulation of
information type was different (see methodological appendix).
The participants were told that after Yiven was put into the market,
an international market research agency was hired by the
manufacturer to investigate user satisfaction levels. They were
told that customer satisfaction ratings had proven to be a very
effective summary measure, resulting from comparisons between
consumer expectations and their actual product experience, on
multiple attributes. Such information was then presented, as
percentage distributions of user ratings on overall satisfaction,
from one star (“very disappointed”) to five stars (“very satisfied”).
In the mixed (inconsistent) information condition, the percent-
age distribution on the five different levels of satisfaction shown
was 10%, 25%, 30%, 25%, and 10% (very disappointed/somewhat
disappointed/neither satisfied nor disappointed/somewhat satisfied/
very satisfied). The mean value of customer satisfaction in this
mixed condition was three stars (neither satisfied nor disappoint-
ed). In the negative information condition, customer satisfaction
covered only the lower levels from one star (very disappointed) to
three stars (neither satisfied nor disappointed): the presented
distribution was 30%, 40%, 30%, 0%, and 0%. The mean value in
this negative condition was two stars (somewhat disappointed). In
the positive information condition, the presented distribution was
0%, 0%, 30%, 40%, and 30%. The mean value of customer
satisfaction in this positive information condition was four stars
(somewhat satisfied).
The prior scales were used for objective ambivalence (α
for three positive and three negative questions = .86 and .89,
respectively): felt ambivalence (α = .65) and discomfort (α = .87).
Results
Manipulation checks
We used the short version of the DSS (dialectical self scale,
Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010) as our dialecticism manipulation
check (α = .66). ANOVA showed that participants in the high
dialecticism condition scored higher (M = 4.95) than those in the
low (M = 4.51; F(1, 153) = 7.46, p b .05). The manipulation of
product attribute information type was also successful. Results
revealed that there was only a main effect of information type on
objective ambivalence (F(2, 149) = 10.28, p b .001), higher
for mixed (M = 1.86) than positive (M = 1.30; t(152) = 4.59,
p b .001) and negative (M = 1.49; t(152) = 2.81, p b .01).
There was no significant difference in the objective ambivalence
ratings of the positive versus negative conditions (t(152) = 1.61,
p N .10).
Felt ambivalence
Replicating earlier results, we found a significant interaction
effect of information type by dialecticism (F(2, 149) = 3.28,
p b .05). For low dialectics, mixed information (M = 3.97)evoked higher felt ambivalence than did both positive (M =
2.91; F(1, 149) = 13.48, p b .001) and negative (M = 2.95;
F(1, 149) = 10.62, p b .001). However, there was no signifi-
cant difference between positive and negative (F(1, 149) b 1,
p N .10). H1a again finds support. As hypothesized, the pattern
was different for high dialectics. Contrast analysis showed
that mixed information (M = 3.83) evoked the same high level
as negative (M = 3.92; F(1149) b 1, p N .10). Both mixed
(F(1, 149) = 6.77, p b .01) and negative information (F(1,
149) = 7.29, p b .01) created significantly higher levels than
positive (M = 3.0), supporting H1b.
Discomfort
We again found a significant interaction effect of informa-
tion type by dialecticism (F(2, 149) = 4.73, p b .01). Further
analysis showed that for low dialectics, mixed information
evoked significantly more discomfort (M = 3.07) than both
positive (M = 2.17; F(1, 149) = 12.58, p b .001) and negative
(M = 2.50; F(1, 149) = 4.52, p b .05) information. Further,
there was no significant difference in the extent of discomfort
caused by positive versus negative information (F(1, 149) =
1.79, p N .10). Thus, H4a was again supported.
For high dialectics, however, the influence pattern differed
greatly. Specifically, it was negative (rather than mixed)
information (M = 3.03) that evoked the highest levels of
discomfort, significantly more than both positive (M = 2.42;
F(1, 149) = 4.86, p b .05) and mixed (M = 2.46; F(1, 149) =
4.02, p b .05). Further, no significant differences in discomfort
emerged between mixed and positive information (F(1, 149) b 1,
p N .10), meaning that mixed information evoked almost the
same low degree of discomfort as positive information. H4b
again finds support.
Moderated mediation
The same bootstrapping test procedures that were applied in
Experiments 1 and 2 were used. We obtained similar results,
again supporting H5. For low dialectics, the mediating role of
felt ambivalence existed only in comparisons between the
positive and mixed condition (95%; β = −.23, CI excluding
zero, from −.55 to −.05), and between negative and mixed
(95%; β = −.23, CI excluding zero, from −.56 to −.034). While
the direct effect of the first mediation process was significant
(β = −.67, CI excluding zero, from −1.21 to −.12), indicating
complementary mediation, the latter mediation process' direct
effect was not significant (β = −.35, CI excluding zero, from −
.91 to .22), indicating indirect-only mediation. For high
dialectics, the mediation effect of felt ambivalence was only
obtained in the comparison between positive and negative
information (95%; β = .17, CI excluding zero, from .0035 to
.48), and the direct effect of information type on discomfort
was not significant (β = .45, CI including zero, from −.11 to
1.00), indicating indirect-only mediation.
Discussion
Because any experimental test using a limited number of
specific product attributes always runs the risk of omitting some
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our third experiment used overall summary information; the
results were still consistent with those derived from our earlier
studies. Further, when the nature of the information consistency/
inconsistency was operationalized by way of the distribution
of ratings, the results derived in the prior experiments were
replicated. Thus, our central results (the moderating role of
dialecticism, the dissociation between felt ambivalence and
discomfort for high dialectics, as well as the moderated mediation
mechanism) possess considerable generalizability, applying well
across both specific and abstract levels of product attributes, and




Though the construct of dialecticism is clearly important, its
effect on consumers' processing of brand-related messages has
not previously been studied in depth (Wyer & Hong, 2010). We
examined here the moderating effects of dialectical thinking not
only on the processing of “mixed-information” messages about
brand strengths and weaknesses (similar to those commonly
found today on brand review websites) but also on purely
negative and purely positive messages. Our series of studies
makes the following five contributions.
First, we significantly broadened our theoretical understand-
ing of the mechanisms by which dialecticism influences the
processing of product information messages. We argued and
showed that high dialectics should be more active searchers for
“the other side of things” (opposite in valence to that which is
seen) more when the incoming information is negative than
when it is positive (or obviously mixed). We then used this
motivational component of dialecticism to show differences
in the degree of ACR generation that consumers report
for presented information—so that even presented univalent
information can create felt ambivalence (consistent with the
arguments and evidence of Priester et al., 2007 and Priester &
Petty, 2001).
Empirically, we established the novel result that for high
dialectics, univalent negative product information produces the
same strong degree of felt ambivalence, and even greater
discomfort, than is observed in mixed-information messages.
For low dialectics, however, it was mixed information that
produced the highest levels of felt ambivalence and discomfort,
higher than either positive or negative messages. Our process
data (tests of mediation and moderated mediation in Study 2)
show clearly, through our measure of ACRs, that it is
these—and not message trustworthiness, or consumer opti-
mism or task involvement—that underlie the observed
differences in levels of felt ambivalence and discomfort across
dialecticism levels.
Second, we showed a very important asymmetry in the
effects of univalent messages that contain positive-only versus
negative-only messages: for high dialectics, negative informa-
tion evoked more felt ambivalence and discomfort thanpositive. This asymmetry did not obtain for lower dialecticism
consumers, who formed similar (and relatively less) felt
ambivalence and discomfort in response to messages contain-
ing positive and negative information. These findings of an
asymmetric effect, replicated in our multiple studies, are a
novel contribution to dialecticism research. Dialectical thinking
is widely presumed to be responsible for providing a balanced
view or endorsement of positive and negative attributes of a
focal object. As a result, it is easy to expect that higher
dialecticism consumers should feel high attitudinal ambiva-
lence and discomfort equally for positive or negative informa-
tion messages. Our results show otherwise.
While this finding is new to the literature, our theoretical
development above provides a strong rationale for why this
asymmetry should arise. We argue, using several streams of
prior research, that high (but not low) dialectical consumers
should experience more ACR generation when faced with
negative than with positive information. This should lead to a
greater co-occurrence of positive and negative information and
affect, therefore greater felt ambivalence and discomfort, for
high dialectics receiving negative-only information. Our tests
using the reported level of generated ACRs support our
theorizing. We thus add to the important literature on negative
information by showing that the previously shown greater
influence of negative over positive information does not obtain
in all circumstances. That is, while prior research shows
negative information always being utilized more, and thus more
influential (e.g. Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), we show that
high versus low dialectics respond in a different manner to
information valence. While low dialectics indeed process
negative information as unambiguously negative, high dialec-
tics instead (because of the greater number of positive ACRs
they self-generate) perceive that the true state of affairs is likely
to be not as negative as stated in the presented information.
Thus, high dialectics should show less of the overweighting of
negative over positive information than the literature has
previously documented. Negative brand information (including
that on brand transgressions, or in online reviews) should thus
have less impact on high dialectics. Future research could test
such possibilities explicitly.
Third, though our examination of low dialectics consumers
revealed parallel effects across the two dependent variables of
felt ambivalence and discomfort, our study shows—for the first
time—that for high dialectics, these effects are not parallel. The
different effects on felt ambivalence compared to discomfort
that were observed for high dialectics serve as novel empirical
evidence for the process view that while high dialectics do
perceive that mixed-information messages make it harder to
form judgments (thus creating felt ambivalence), such mes-
sages do not create high discomfort in them. Instead, it is
negative information that creates both high felt ambivalence
and high discomfort for them.
Fourth, our series of experiments provided support for our
hypothesized outcomes by using multiple complementary
operationalizations. Experiments 1 and 2 used common but
different product settings (MP3 players and Pad tablets) and
exposed respondents to positive, negative, and mixed attribute-
393H. Wang et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 26, 3 (2016) 381–394level information (only positive and negative in study 2), and to
primed (manipulated) dialecticism. Experiment 3 used sum-
mary instead of the specific attribute information that was the
focus in Experiments 1 and 2 and communicated information
inconsistency via the distribution of customer responses to a
summary index of customer satisfaction. Our results were
replicated across the three studies. Our central conclusions
(the moderation by dialecticism, the dissociation between felt
ambivalence and discomfort for high dialectics, and the
moderated mediation mechanism) can therefore be general-
ized to multiple real-world formats of product information
presentation.
Finally, our novel method of manipulating (priming)
dialecticism on a within-culture basis—consistent with the
currently favored “situated cognition” perspective (e.g., Oyserman
& Sorensen, 2009)—went well beyond the methods used in
previous studies (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004;Williams &Aaker,
2002) and should itself be of value to future academic research.
Prior studies typically assumed, or simply measured, between-
culture differences in dialecticism and similar constructs (Aaker &
Sengupta, 2000; Williams & Aaker, 2002). In prior research
manipulating dialecticism (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2010), differences were only examined between a
group of dialectics and a control group, leading to results that are
more ambiguous than those we provide through a manipulated
high versus low dialectical comparison. We do acknowledge
that our manipulation used two techniques (proverb completion
and paragraph-induced story recall) and could be viewed as
‘heavy-handed’. While these double manipulations made the
effects stronger, they do leave some uncertainty about which one of
them is more crucial, and may have created higher dialecticism
than occurs in daily life.
Limitations and future research
Naturally, our studies suffer from some other limitations
as well, which need to be addressed in future research. These
include weak alpha reliability coefficients for some scales
including DSS, suggesting the need for more DSS scale
development work in cross-cultural contexts, and for further
analyzing its possibly multi-factor structure. ACRs, too, need
more measure development: multiple rather than single scales
should be used in future research. There was also arguably a
confound in our last study, where the mixed-information
condition differed not only in the variance of the information
but also the mean (3 stars) which could equate to a neutral (not
just mixed) message. However, the fact that higher dialecticism
consumers did feel high discomfort in that condition argues
against this message as being seen as merely neutral. We note
also that while our studies were conducted in China since that is
an appropriate location to study dialecticism—because it is an
especially noteworthy aspect of Chinese culture (Nisbett et al.,
2001)—the within-culture effects we found in China might
well differ in other cultures, or in a comparison between China
and North America. More work is also needed to see how
effects might differ in other product categories (beyond the
electronics we studied) and in other domains.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2015.10.003.References
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